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T
here are at least two broad issues that
must be addressed before the story of
deficit elimination in Canada and the
impact on economic performance and social
progress can be told. First, where to start the
story, and second, how to define social
progress.
One could begin the story in the
1960s, the last time Canadian governments
ran balanced budgets. After that, there was a
fairly steady fiscal deterioration through the
1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s. The
combined federal-provincial deficit did
decline from 10.4 percent of GDP in 1984-
85 to 5.1 percent in 1989-90 (unless other-
wise indicated, all data are on a public
accounts basis), but virtually all of this
improvement came from economic growth
with only a negligible role from policy tight-
ening over the five years. The combined fed-
eral-provincial deficit hit 9.5 percent of GDP
in 1992-93 and the combined debt-to-GDP
ratio peaked at 98.7 percent in 1995-96.
This was followed by a very sharp correction,
which saw the combined deficit eliminated
by 1997-98 and the debt-to-GDP ratio start
to decline. Over this 30-year period, many
critical things could be said about fiscal man-
agement and its impact on economic per-
formance and social progress. The entire
period was characterized by lower-than-aver-
age growth than in preceding periods, two
deep recessions with a very slow recovery the
second time, high unemployment on average
and periods such as the late 1980s when fis-
cal policy was working at a cross purpose to
monetary policy. One will not find evidence,
in this period, that running large deficits and
letting the debt burden soar led to good eco-
nomic performance.
Alternatively, the story could start from
the early 1990s. In this case, one would sim-
ply accept the starting point of huge deficits
and a very high debt-to-GDP ratio. The ques-
tion then becomes: Was it wise to take bold
actions to eliminate this deficit and reverse the
deterioration in the debt burden? Even here,
the earlier history cannot be forgotten. It
would not be a reasonable test to ask whether
the process of deficit elimination improved
economic performance. Surely some cost, per-
haps only of a transitional nature, was to be
expected after such a long period of poor fis-


































































and Social Progress in 
Canada in the 1990s
Don Drummond
drummond.qxd  24/05/01  9:35 AM  Page 131ic performance. Finally, some comments will
be made on social progress.
MEASURING THE EXTENT 
OF FISCAL TIGHTENING
The combined federal-provincial (pub-
lic accounts) budget balance went from a
deficit of 8.6 percent of GDP in 1993-94 to
a balance by 1997-98. That represents an
average annual improvement of 2.15 percent
of GDP. Seventy-two percent of the improve-
ment came at the federal level.
In order to analyse the impact of deficit
elimination on economic performance, we
must identify how much of the improvement
came from discretionary policy changes. A
standard way of doing this is to look at the
changes in cyclically adjusted budget bal-
ances (calendar year, national accounts data).
This measure removes any changes to budg-




Canadian Federal and Provincial
Government Budget Balances
federal budget balances
68-69 71-72 74-75 77-78 80-81 83-84 86-87 89-90 92-93 95-96 98-99
Percent of nominal GDP
Surpluses











Source: Fiscal Reference Tables, September 2000, 
Finance Canada, TD Economics.
CHART 2
Canadian Federal and Provincial
Net Public Debt
federal debt-to-GDP ratio
68-69 71-72 74-75 77-78 80-81 83-84 86-87 89-90 92-93 95-96 98-99










Source: Fiscal Reference Tables, September 2000, 
Finance Canada, TD Economics.
be whether the cost to economic performance
outweighed the advantages of correcting many
of the problems that built up over more than
two decades. It is this latter approach that this
article takes. In fact, the starting point chosen
for the story is the 1993-94 fiscal year.
Although this was the peak for neither the
deficit nor the debt burden, it is the year prior
to that in which the first serious attempts were
made by either the federal or provincial gov-
ernments to tighten fiscal policy.
The second tricky issue is what is
meant by social progress. That is addressed
in a separate article in this volume. That arti-
cle does not advance any particular quantita-
tive measures as being useful. For the most
part, this article will address questions of eco-
nomic performance although some general
references will be made to social indicators.
This article will first describe the
extent of fiscal tightening after 1993-94.
Then it will turn to the impact on econom-
drummond.qxd  24/05/01  9:35 AM  Page 132growing either more slowly or more rapidly
than at some longer-run “normal” pace. As
such, it isolates the discretionary policy
changes. Chart 3 plots the changes estimat-
ed by Finance Canada in the cyclically adjust-
ed budget balances at the federal and total
government sector. According to these esti-
mates, at both the federal and total govern-
ment levels, 87 percent of the fiscal
turnaround from 1993 to 1997 can be
thought of as stemming from discretionary
policy changes. This result is somewhat sen-
sitive to the methodology and a variety of
assumptions, although the estimates of the
OECD (OECD Economic Surveys: Canada,
August 2000) indicate that the portion
attributable to policy change is just slightly
less. OECD data also indicate that the dis-
cretionary policy tightening in Canada was
among the most pronounced episodes over a
four-year period in any OECD country.
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TABLE 1
Federal and Provincial Government 
Budget Balances
(Share of nominal GDP)
Source: Fiscal Reference Tables, September 2000, 
Finance Canada, TD Economics.
CHART 3
Changes in Cyclically Adjusted 
Budget Balances1
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1 National Accounts balances as a percentage of GDP at
factor cost.
2 Real gross domestic product in 1992 dollars.
Source: Fiscal Reference Tables, September 2000,
Finance Canada, TD Economics.
Federal &
Federal Provincial  Provincial
1993-94 -5.8  -2.8  -8.6
1997-98 0.4  -0.4  0.0
Total Change  6.2  2.4  8.6
Average Annual  1.6  0.6  2.2
Change 
A second methodology would be to
compile the estimates of discretionary policy
change provided in each budget document.
There is a fair bit of arbitrariness to this,
however. For example, growth in various
department spending profiles can be changed
quite radically over time without this being
described in a budget document as a discre-
tionary change.
Another approach is to analyse the
changes in the major budget components
with respect to GDP. This is done in Table 2
for the federal government. In order to meas-
ure the impact of discretionary fiscal tight-
ening, a “policy-neutral” case must first be
defined. In the case of revenues, this is
defined as a constant revenue-to-GDP ratio.
Implicit in this definition is the notion that
if the government were not trying to reduce
the deficit, it would introduce tax adjust-
ments to neutralize the tendency of the rev-
enue-to-GDP ratio to rise over time. This
tendency is caused by the interaction of eco-
nomic growth with a non-indexed tax sys-
tem. For expenditures, some define a
policy-neutral case as program spending
maintaining its share of GDP. This implies a
drummond.qxd  24/05/01  9:35 AM  Page 133lation and inflation, there would have been
an improvement in the federal operating
balance (revenues less program spending) of
1.5 percentage points of GDP. After adjust-
ments for various accounting changes, the
actual improvement was 5.8 percentage
points. So this analysis indicates that about
three quarters of the actual federal fiscal
improvement stemmed from discretionary
policy tightening.
Upon looking at two sources of cyclical-
ly adjusted budget balances and the above sim-
ple analysis of ratios to GDP, the conclusion
that the bulk of the actual fiscal improvement
was due to discretionary policy tightening
seems very robust. The corollary to this state-
ment is that little fiscal improvement would
have been realized through 1997-98 if gov-
ernments had not taken deliberate action. In
other words, in the counterfactual world of no
discretionary policy tightening, if economic
performance had remained as actually record-




Changes in Federal Government 
Operating Balance
(Share of nominal GDP)
1 Increased 0.4 percentage points to remove the effect
of an extra Canada Child Tax Benefit payment (negative
revenue) and the accelerated timing of personal income
tax refunds that year.
2 Lowered 0.6 percentage points to remove the effect of
one-time bookings for the Canada Millennium
Scholarship Foundation, Hepatitis C compensation, the
aboriginal healing strategy and changes in accounting
for International Financial Institutions. 
Source: Department of Finance, TD Economics.
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Note: Last month plotted: October 2000.
Source: Bank of Canada, DRI Canada, TD Economics.
Diff. between
1997-98 97-98 Actual
1993-94 1997-98 “Neutral and “Neutral
Adj. Adj.  Projection” Projection”
Revenues 16.4  1 17.4 16.4  1.0
Program   16.6  11.8 2 15.1 -3.3
Spending
Operating -0.2  5.6  1.3  4.3
Balance
steady enrichment of public goods and serv-
ices over time. Instead, the policy-neutral
case is defined here as spen ding growing
with inflation and population — in other
words, constant in real per capita terms. Over
the 1993 to 1997 period, this means total
nominal spending growth averaging 2.5 per-
cent per year. Finally, a few adjustments are
made to the actual data to remove special
entries largely related to accounting (see the
footnote to Table 2). Public debt charges are
left out of this analysis because there were no
direct policy changes which lowered these
payments. In fact, the lengthening of the
terms of maturity during a period of a posi-
tively sloped yield curve raised the cost of
debt financing.
Had the federal revenue-to-GDP ratio
remained flat from 1993-94 and program
spending been allowed to grow with popu-
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made in lowering deficits and the debt-to-
GDP ratio would likely have continued to rise.
As federal budget surpluses were
recorded just four years after serious efforts
were begun to eliminate the deficit, it is
often suggested that the optimal fiscal policy
course would have been a more gradual
tightening. With the benefit of hindsight,
this at least appears to be a point worth
debating. However, the odds were stacked
against such an option in 1993 and 1994.
Several prior tepid attempts to tighten fiscal
policy had not achieved lasting success. In
fact, they probably left a net cost due to the
loss of policy confidence. Another couple of
years of high deficits and a rising debt-to-
GDP ratio following 1993-94 may well have
contributed further to this loss of confidence.
In turn, this could have caused economic per-
formance to worsen.
Another counterfactual case often put
forward is that fiscal policy would have need-
Deficit Elimination, Economic Performance 
and Social Progress in Canada in the 1990s
CHART 5
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Note: Forecast by TD Economics as at September 2000;
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ed less tightening if monetary policy had
been looser. The conduct of monetary policy
in the 1990s is addressed elsewhere in this
volume. As monetary policy is managed
independently by the Bank of Canada, it is
taken as a given for the purpose of this arti-
cle. It must be pointed out, however, that
while the policy authorities are separated, the
policies are not. Poor fiscal performance was
one of the factors keeping interest rates up in
Canada. It is to this, and the link from fiscal
policy to other economic indicators, that we
now turn.
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
DURING THE PROCESS OF 
DEFICIT ELIMINATION
We now need to estimate, or at least
make inferences about, the impact of the dis-
cretionary policy tightening on economic per-
formance. Ideally we need to infer what
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absence of the policy tightening. Of course we
don’t have a neat, controlled experiment to do
this, although we do have a long sample peri-
od when rising deficits and debt burdens were
associated with sub-par economic perform-
ance. We could assume that changes in the
cyclically adjusted budget balances have a one-
for-one impact on economic output. This
would amount to assuming a fiscal multipli-
er of one. However, there is no sound basis
upon which to make this assumption. Various
econometric models could be used to estimate
the multiplier, but the results would be very
sensitive to model specification and assump-
tions. This article will take a more descriptive
and hence subjective approach.
First, let us look at recent economic
performance six years after the intensive
efforts at deficit elimination began. The
economy grew very steadily through the end
of 2000. By virtually any estimate of poten-
tial output, the economy was very near to
closing or had finally closed the output gap
that opened in the early 1990s, the unem-
ployment rate was close to a 25-year low,
inflation was low, interest rates were below
US levels, investment was booming and we
had a record current account surplus. In
short, there was not much wrong with this
picture. So if there has been an economic cost
to deficit elimination, it must have been
transitional.
The effects on policy flexibility have
already become abundantly clear as well.
The federal government and most provin-
cial governments have the luxury of choos-
ing how to allocate surplus funds to tax
relief, higher program spending or faster
debt retirement. The lower public debt bur-
den helps foster the capital formation need-
ed in this economic environment of rapidly
changing technologies.
Let us now look at the shorter run to
see how the economy absorbed what
amounted to a 9 percent of GDP swing in
the total government cyclically adjusted
budget balance from 1993 to 1997. Real
GDP grew 4.7 percent in 1994 before two
shaky years of 2.8 and 1.5 percent and then
rebounded to 4.4 percent in 1997, for a
four-year average of 3.4 percent. While the
economy could have performed better given
the large output gap, growth at around the
potential pace wasn’t bad considering the
extent of fiscal tightening.
The components of growth provide
clear evidence of a classic case of fiscal
“crowding in.” That is, the private sector
stepped up to replace the demand withdraw-
al from fiscal retrenchment. First, for the first
time in decades Canadian interest rates fell
below their US counterparts. This occurred
first for short-term maturities and then for
longer-term issues as the yield curve flat-
tened. In fact, by late 2000 segments of the
yield curve were negatively sloped despite a
robust economy. The maintenance of low
inflation is a factor, but no doubt improved
fiscal performance in the United States and
Canada has played a role. The Bank of
Canada has acknowledged on many occasions
how helpful the fiscal tightening was to
efforts to get Canadian interest rates down.
For example, in a speech to the Canadian
Society of New York, on 9 March 2000,
Governor Thiessen said, “As progress was
made in restoring fiscal credibility, the Bank
of Canada was able to lower its policy rate
during 1996-97, to levels well below the
comparable US Federal Reserve rate. Both
market interest rates and the exchange rate
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late foreign and domestic demand and so
moderate the effects of fiscal restraint on eco-
nomic activity” (p. 3). Second, after lagging
badly behind the United States since the
beginning of the 1990s, investment started
to revive, particularly in machinery and
equipment. This offered the hope of Canada
soon enjoying the kinds of productivity
growth the United States has been experi-
encing for several years. Third, the Canadian
trade balance improved enormously, with the
strong growth in the US economy helping
quite a bit of course.
So economic performance was pretty
good during the years of deficit elimination
and got even better once the deficits were
gone. We will of course never know what the
performance would have been had serious
steps not been taken to tighten fiscal policy.
But as the deficit would have remained large
with a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, it can be
argued that we would not have got interest
rates down as much and business and con-
sumer confidence would not have strength-
ened to the same extent. At best the
Canadian economy would have returned to
its potential level of output somewhat earli-
er. Even this is not clear. What is clear is that
the fiscal situation would have remained
problematic.
THE NATURE OF THE FISCAL
TIGHTENING AND SOCIAL
PROGRESS
There is a debate over how far strong
job creation can go in addressing issues of
“social progress.” However, one thing is cer-
tain. It can’t hurt. Chart 7 shows that
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CHART 7
Canadian Labour Market Performance
unemployment rate (right scale)
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f forecast by TD Economics as at October 2000.
Source: Statistics Canada, TD Economics.
employment grew throughout the period of
deficit elimination and the unemployment
rate fell steadily. Employment did not
expand rapidly enough, however, to raise real
personal income per capita, and on an after-
tax basis this measure of income continued
to fall until 1997. However, both measures
have now recovered to the peak levels of the
beginning of the 1990s, and with employ-
ment and wages continuing to rise, while
taxes are being cut, disposable incomes
should continue to grow.
Throughout the 1990s the distribution
of income moved away from the lower end
towards the higher end. However, this like-
ly had much more to do with changes in the
economy and in particular the rising educa-
tion and skill requirements for new jobs and
the strength in the stock market than with
fiscal policy. Even to the degree fiscal policy
had a role, it would be difficult to say that
the process of deficit elimination was the root
problem. The deficit could have been elimi-
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the $5.5 billion of one-time entries in 1997-
98, program spending would have stayed
down at $103.3 billion that year. In contrast,
if program spending had grown with popu-
lation and inflation since 1993-94, it would
have stood at $132.6 billion in 1997-98. So
without a doubt the cuts to spending were
substantial. Of course, some of this was due
to economic growth. For example, of the
$16.7 billion decline in spending from 1993-
94 to 1997-98 (after removing the $5.5 bil-
lion of one-time entries), $5.8 billion came
from lower Employment Insurance benefits
and, in turn, about one half of that decline
came from lower unemployment. Even the
roughly $3 billion of benefit tightening from
discretionary policy change should not be
interpreted as being a pure drag on econom-
ic performance. The tightening was designed
to improve the incentives to work and in par-
ticular to shift from seasonal to more year-
round employment.
Table 3 shows the changes in program
spending from 1993-94 to 1997-98 by major
component. Old age security payments were
not subject to restraint and hence grew with
the relevant population and inflation. EI ben-
efits were discussed above. Transfers to
provinces fell $6.4 billion. Beginning in the
1980s, various measures were introduced to
curtail the growth of transfers to the
provinces. In particular, as of 1990 the
Canada Assistance Plan payments to the non-
equalization-receiving provinces were
restrained. Effective in 1996-97 the transfers
were consolidated into the Canada Health
and Social Transfer. This ended any statuto-
ry cost-sharing between the two levels of
government. The CHST is notionally for
health, post-secondary education and social
Don Drummond
nated in a variety of ways, each having dif-
fering impacts upon income distribution.
That is the question we now turn to.
So far, deficit elimination has been
analysed from an aggregate or macroeco-
nomic perspective. But can it be argued that
the fiscal tightening hurt economic perform-
ance and social progress because of the par-
ticular manner in which it was done? It
would be hard to make this case on the rev-
enue side. There were very few revenue-rais-
ing actions taken over the period of deficit
elimination. In fact, the only rate increase
was for the excise tax on gasoline. There was
some base broadening, but this largely affect-
ed corporations and higher-income individ-
uals, not the usual fodder for criticisms on
social progress. So if there is a negative case,
it must rest on the program spending side.
For the federal government, aggregate
program spending in nominal dollars was
reduced from $120.0 billion in 1993-94 to a
low of $104.8 billion in 1996-97, before ris-
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Source: Statistics Canada, TD Economics.
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can be used in any fashion the provinces
wish. That being said, there is no doubt that
cuts to these transfers were a catalyst for a
good part of the restraint exercised by the
provinces in health care, post-secondary edu-
cation and welfare. To the degree that fiscal
restraint led to some needed financial reforms
in the health-care sector, there is one offset-
ting benefit. However, there can be no deny-
ing that health care, post-secondary
education and welfare are areas where deficit
elimination hurt and hence a case can be
made that these cuts impeded social, and eco-
nomic, progress for a time. It should be
noted that the cash transfers to the provinces
under these programs will soon be restored
to the previous peak levels and will grow
with an escalator. As well, it should be noted
that the federal government has contributed
in these areas in other ways, such as directly
funding university-based research through
the endowment of the Canada Foundation for
Innovation, and supporting students through
enhanced tax measures and the Canada
Millennium Scholarships. The federally fund-
ed Canada Child Tax Benefit will soon reach
$7 billion on an annual basis whereas the for-
mer Family Allowances never exceeded $2.8
billion. The increased federal support has not
only boosted incomes for families with chil-
dren but has allowed the provinces to divert
their funding away from income support to
in-kind services to ensure that people do not
lose benefits when they become employed.
After removing the $5.5 billion of one-
time entries, subsidies and other transfers fell
$1.5 billion. Within this category, there was
a large shift away from business subsidies,
which were cut 70 percent under Program
Review, towards support programs, such as
those for aboriginals, which continued to grow
rapidly throughout the period. Expenditures
relating to Crown corporations went down
substantially, but only $0.6 billion of that
relates to cuts under Program Review. The rest
stems from large provisions recorded in 1993-
94 to capture prior-year losses, whereas by
1997-98 many of the corporations were mak-
ing a profit. National Defence spending was
pared down substantially and the total of all
other operating expenditures hardly changed
at all despite the population growth and infla-
tion over the four years.
This review of program spending
indicates that efforts were made to preserve
spending in a number of areas typically
thought to relate to social progress. In
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TABLE 3
Federal Government Program Spending
(Billions of dollars)
1993-94 1997-98 Change
Total Program Spending 120.0 108.8 -11.2
Old Age Security 19.9 22.2 +2.3
Employment Insurance  17.6 11.8 -5.8
Benefits
EPF/CHST 16.8 10.5 -6.3
Fiscal transfers   10.1  10.0  -0.1
(incl. equalization)
Other transfers and  18.5  22.5  +4.0
subsidies1
Crown corporations2 5.3 2.5  -2.8
National Defence  11.3  8.9  -2.4
Other departments  20.5  20.3  -0.2
and agencies
1 The 1997-98 figures include $5.5 billion of one-time
entries which would not be expected to have an eco-
nomic effect in that year. Excl. these entries, other trans-
fers and subsidies fell $1.5 billion. 
2 Only $0.6 billion of the decline from 1993-94 to 1997-98
relates to cuts from program review. For 1993-94, large
entries were recorded to cover prior-year losses whereas
by 1997-98, many crown corporations were making a
profit. 
Source: Fiscal Reference Tables, September 2000,
Finance Canada, TD Economics.
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such as health care, funding has largely
been restored. There is no doubt that if one
were to go a layer further in the program
detail, one would find many examples of
deep cuts, or outright elimination of pro-
grams related to social policy. But it is
important to recognize that one of the rea-
sons why the federal government’s deficit-
elimination effort was broadly accepted,
indeed encouraged, by Canadians is that it
was seen as broad. It can be argued that
more selectivity in the cuts would have
risked undermining that support and
hence made the effort much more difficult
politically to accomplish.
CONCLUSION
All in all, one would have to say that the
experience of deficit elimination worked out
very well, likely better than almost any observ-
er in the early 1990s, including governments,
would have thought. The economy has per-
formed well in terms of output and employ-
ment growth and the unemployment rate has
come down sharply. Not only is the deficit
eliminated at the federal and total government
sector level, but the debt burden is down
sharply. This presents much more choice going
forward than could have been dreamed of a few
years ago. As just one example, instead of 36
cents of every federal revenue dollar going to
debt payments, it is now 25 cents. That is still
way too high, but it frees up 11 cents on the
revenue dollar for lower taxes, higher program
spending or faster progress on debt retirement.
The lower public debt burden as well as the
shift in government spending from a con-
sumption-base (such as subsidies) to an invest-
ment base (such as research) will foster the
capital formation the economy needs to raise its
potential output growth rate.
It would be foolish to argue that there
was no pain from the experience. After all,
what could be expected after the depth of the
fiscal mess by 1993-94? Some of the signs of
that pain are apparent on the program side,
such as problems in the health-care sector
and underfunded post-secondary education.
On the economic front, changes in the econ-
omy skewed the income distribution more to
the higher end and governments may not
have been as free to support those with lower
incomes had they not been in deficit-elimi-
nation mode. However, at the very worst, the
charge against deficit elimination is that
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